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PROFESSIONALISM: THE DEEP THEORY
DANIEL R. COQUILLETE *
Recently I went to a little shop in Georgetown to buy my wife a teapot.
The owner was a charming old lady with a sweet smile. We started talking,
and she asked me what I did.
"Oh," I said, "I'm a law professor."
She smiled again and asked, "Does that mean you train lawyers?"
"Why yes," I replied.
"Well," she said, "perhaps you can help me answer this question: if a
litigator, a divorce lawyer, and a corporate counsel all jump at the same
time from a ten story window, who hits the ground first?"
"Gosh," I said, "I don't know!"
With the same sweet smile she looked up and said, "Who cares?"
The profession of being a lawyer has been the focus of my academic
work as a legal historian and as a specialist in legal ethics. More important,
it has been the business of my life, as it has been the business of your lives.
I have taught for twelve years in four law schools and have practiced law
for ten years. I believe that my profession, and your profession, is in deep
trouble today. The question is, "Who cares?"
Notice my choice of words. It is not our "occupation," our "career," or
our "vocation" that is in trouble. It is our "profession." There is a big
difference among these terms. "Occupation," from the Latin occupatio, re-
fers to "means of passing one's time"'-simply a way to pass the time each
day. I hope we all are doing more than this! "Career" is somewhat more
elevated. It comes from the Latin carraria, or "vehicle," and refers to a
forward motion through life.2 It shares the same root word as "careen"'3-
the way vehicles are driven in Boston. Some of us are certainly "careen-
ing" through life, and yet, there should be more. Finally, there is "voca-
tion," from the Latin vocare, meaning "to call."4 Historically, it refers to a
divine call in the sense of being fit for something, talented in something.5
* Professor of Law, Boston College Law School; Reporter, Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure, Judicial Conference of the United States.
1. THF CONCISE OXFORD DICrIONARY OF CuRRENT ENGLISH 702 (J.B. Sykes ed., 7th ed.
1982).
2. Id. at 139.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 1202.
5. Id.
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Simply passing your time in an occupation, or careening through life
in a career, or even being called by your talent to a particular job does not
require anything from you. But being a "professional" most certainly does.
Here the root is the Latin professio, or "declaration," 6 referring to a vow, a
declaration of belief-an avowal made by you. All of you have taken "pro-
fessional" oaths. These oaths require you to uphold the rule of law and to
obey the regulations of the bar. They are not equivocal. You took these
oaths in open court. If your word means anything, you are committed to
this formal "profession" of obedience and to other "professional" duties.
This obligation is a deeply personal one. It is a delusion of young,
inexperienced lawyers to think that they can separate their personal from
their professional lives and their personal from their professional morality.
The current jargon refers to this dichotomy as "role-defined" ethics. It is
true intellectual rubbish. As Aristotle observed:
The man, then, must be a perfect fool who is unaware that peo-
ple's characters take their bias from the steady direction of their
activities. If a man, well aware of what he is doing, behaves in
such a way that he is bound to become unjust, we can only say
that he is voluntarily unjust.7
You cannot be a bad person and a good lawyer, nor can you be a good
person and a lawyer with sharp practices. A lawyer who behaves like a jerk
in court is not an "aggressive advocate" with an "assertive strategy," but a
jerk.
I was told that W.C. Fields once paused by a tombstone that read,
"Here lies a lawyer and an honest man" and remarked, "How did they get
two bodies under there?" We can't split ourselves down the middle. In-
deed, the word "integrity" itself comes from the Latin root integritas, as in
"integral" and "integration."' It means "wholeness" or "oneness." There is
just one of each of us.
This means our professional identity as lawyers is at the center of our
personal morality. And where do we get this identity? From our legal edu-
cation, both at law school and, equally importantly, from the bar itself.
Some of the most important lessons I have learned about professional ethics
came not from my law professors but from my law partners and, indeed,
from my professional adversaries in the heat of trial.
I believe our profession is in crisis today not because the American
Bar Association has a bad media strategy, but because we have lost sight of
6. Id. at 821; see D.P. SIMPSON, CASSELL'S NEw LATIN DICnONARY 477 (1959).
7. ARISo=T, THE ETHICS OF AmSTOTtE 91 (J.A.K. Thompson trans., Penguin Books
1955) (1953).
8. THE Co cIsE OXFORD DICnONARY, supra note 1, at 521.
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the "deep theory" of professionalism in the classroom, in the office, and in
the courtroom. What is a "deep theory?" Let me explain.
"Deep theory" focuses on our ultimate motivation for obeying rules.
9
There are three common categories: "goal-based," "rights-based," and
"duty-based." Goal-based deep theories focus solely on political or eco-
nomic outcomes. Examples include Marxism, fascism, and utilitarianism.
If obedience to a rule promotes your goal, then obey it. If it doesn't, then
don't, unless you might get caught. Suppose you obey the ABA Model
Rules because if you don't, you might get disbarred, and you won't be able
to afford that new car. That's a goal-based deep theory. From Marx to
Machiavelli, goal-based theories have been easy to understand and imple-
ment. Best of all, they require no intrinsic test of the means that you em-
ploy to achieve your goal.
Recent developments in legal education, particularly legal realism and
critical legal theory, have emphasized the function of law as an "instru-
ment" to achieve particular political, social, or economic ends.10 This is
legal education with a goal-based deep theory. The older ideals of a "neu-
tral" rule of law have been debunked as, at best, a pious myth, and, at worst,
a deliberate effort by the powerful to exploit the weak under an illusion of
"fairness" of principle. Many students become convinced that professional-
ism means being willing to pursue the ends of others, irrespective of the
means. It ultimately puts the client, for good or bad, in the driver's seat,
and the ideal of justice becomes secondary.
This goal-based deep theory of education is very old. Indeed, it goes
back to Greek philosophical schools known as the "Pre-Socratics."' One
of these schools taught that all morality is relative: What's good for you is
good for you, and my notion of goodness is entirely personal as well. There
is no objective standard of a good person or of good conduct. This school
was called the Cynics, from which we derive the pejorative word "cynical."
The Pre-Socratics, however, did not treat such notions of moral relativism
as inherently bad, and neither do many modem American law teachers.
If you subscribe to the School of Cynics, or moral relativism, your
goal in teaching is to equip each student to pursue as ably and effectively as
possible her individual view of what is good. The Greek Pre-Socratics
called this doctrine the Sophist School. The Sophists taught rhetoric, logic,
9. For a discussion of "goal-based," "rights-based," and "duty-based" "deep theories," see
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 172-73 (1977).
10. See Roger C. Cramton, The Ordinary Religion of the Law School Classroom, 29 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 247, 250 (1978).
11. For an engaging, if elementary, introduction to the Pre-Socratics, see BERTRAND Rus-
SELL, A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHI.osopnY 3-81 (1945). See also ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, A
SHORT HISTORY OF ETmIcs 14-25 (1966).
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and advocacy. If you used these skills to promote a military dictatorship,
such as Sparta, well fine. If you used them to support a democracy, such as
Athens, fine again. If your view of the good led you to become a swindler,
well, that was your business, too. Cynicism and Sophism, in the classical
Greek sense, are alive and well in American law schools today. Moral rela-
tivism and its corollary-a theory of "professional" teaching that equips
each future lawyer to pursue whatever ends she or her client may choose-
may be found everywhere. Thus, moral relativism and goal-based deep the-
ories go hand in hand.
In the final analysis, however, democracies are poor settings for goal-
based deep theories. As you may have noticed, democracies have trouble
getting anything done efficiently. At least in the short run, totalitarian re-
gimes-even very evil regimes-can pursue some ends better than democ-
racies. Our faith in a democratic rule of law cannot be solely instrumental.
Consequently, most democratic systems, including our own, have histori-
cally been founded on rights-based deep theories rather than goal-based the-
ories. The focus in a rights-based deep theory is on human freedom.
Perhaps the most famous modem rights-based deep theory is that of John
Rawls. He asks us to imagine ourselves in an "original position," a kind of
meeting before we are born-ignorant of our sex, race, size, health, intelli-
gence, social, or economic class.12 What ground rules would we all agree
to? Rawls postulates at least two. Put roughly by Ronald Dworkin they are
"that every person must have the largest political liberty compatible with a
like liberty for all" and "that inequalities in power, wealth, income, and
other resources must not exist except insofar as they work to the absolute
benefit of the worst-off members of society."13 These so-called "principles
of justice" in turn become touchstones to test the validity of all positive
laws.
The trouble with rights-based deep theories is that they are excellent
for defining the parameters of personal freedoms, but are less helpful in
making critical choices within our own area of freedom. We can live an
almost totally depraved life in complete accord with the Constitution and
laws of the United States. Indeed, one could argue that we have a legal
"right" to lead a depraved life. Put bluntly, rights-based deep theories are
powerful tools for defending the freedoms of clients and of other people in
general. As professionals, however, do not really help us personally, be-
cause they fail to answer the affirmative questions such as what exactly we
must do to be a good person and a good lawyer.
12. See DWORKIN, supra note 9, at 150-181. Dworkin provides an excellent introduction to
John Rawls's great but difficult book, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
13. DWORKIN, supra note 9, at 150.
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This leaves us with duty-based deep theories. Many of them have
fancy names, like "Neo-Platonism," "Neo-Kantianism," and "Neo-Tho-
mism." In fact, duty-based deep systems are familiar because they are
founded on the great classical and religious traditions that we so widely
share. 
14
A key tenet of a duty-based system is that good acts do not necessarily
lead to good results, at least not in this life. All great religions put us on
notice that a good, even holy, life will not necessarily be free from cruel
blows and bitter disappointments. If we measure our success by achieve-
ment, such as political or economic power, or by glory, we cannot ensure
these results by being virtuous. Indeed, goal-based philosophers such as
Machiavelli argue that we actually can be rewarded for doing evil, particu-
larly if we pretend to do good in public and do evil in secret.1
5
Here is a true historical irony. If we go back to the origins of our
professional traditions in the Inns of Court, or to the foundations of the
American legal profession and the first American law schools, we will dis-
cover a duty-based deep theory for the formalization of legal education in
the Anglo-American tradition. Law was initially taught as a humanistic
study in both American and English universities. 6 The Inns of Court-the
ultimate source of the "barrister ideal" in English law-strengthened the
identification of individual lawyers with the system of justice.' 7 Maintain-
14. See F.H. BRADLEY, ETHICAL STUDIES 162-74 (1990); A.C. EWING, ETHICS 49-61 (1965);
cf. Bernard Williams, Politics and Moral Character, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY 55,66-71
(Stuart Hampshire ed., 1978) (discussing the desirability of immoral acts to reach legal or political
ends). For an explanation of duty theory from the master himself, see IMMANUEL KANT, Theory
and Practice Concerning the Common Saying: This May Be True in Theory But Does Not Apply
in Practice, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT 412, 412-29 (Carl J. Friedrich ed., 1949).
15. See NIccoLo MACHIAVELLI, Tam PRINCE 43-49 (W.K. Marriott trans., 1958).
16. For a discussion of the role of humanism in early English university study of law, see
HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAw AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADI-
TION 120-64 (1983); DANIEL R. CoQuILLETrE, THE CIVILIAN WRITERS OF DOCTORS' COmmMONS,
LONDON 24-27 (1988); FRANCIS DE ZuLUETA & PETER STEIN, THm TEACHING OF ROMAN LAW IN
ENGLAND AROUND 1200, at xiii-xxvii (1990); ALAN HARDING, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 185-90 (1965); 1 SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 118-19 (2d ed. 1898).
For a discussion of the role of humanism in early American legal education, see LAWRENCE
M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 84-85, 278-82 (1973); Daniel R. Coquillette, Jus-
tinian in Braintree: John Adams, Civilian Learning, and Legal Elitism, 1758-1775, in LAW IN
COLONIAL MASSACHUSETmS 359, 359418 (Daniel R. Coquillette et al. eds., 1984).
17. For an introduction to the importance of the Inns of Court, see J.H. BAKER, AN INTRo-
DUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 187, 194-96 (3d ed. 1990); SIR ROBERT MEGARRY, INNS
ANCIENT AND MODERN 3-14, 48-50 (1972); E.W. Ives, The Common Lawyers, in PROFESSION,
VOCATION AND CULTURE IN LATER MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 181, 181-217 (Cecil H. Clough ed.,
1982). For more detailed studies, see J.H. BAKER, The Inns of Court in 1388, in THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND aHm COMMON LAW 3, 3-6 (1986); J.H. BAKER, Learning Exercises in the Medie-
val Inns of Court and Chancery, in THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND THE COMMON LAW, supra, at 7,
7-24; E.W. IVEs, THE COMMON LAWYERS OF PRE-REFORMATION ENGLAND 7-89 (1983); DAVID S.
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ing this identity was seen as a professional duty. The diaries and legal
papers of early American lawyers, including John Adams, Thomas Jeffer-
son, and Alexander Hamilton, show that they shared these ideals.
I do not have time here to trace the details of how American legal
education left its roots for the more modem emphasis on goal instrumental-
ism. But I do believe this shift lies at the heart of our identity crisis as a
profession. This is not a superficial problem. It cannot be solved by re-
quired ethics courses or media consultants. It requires a major reexamina-
tion of what we, as lawyers, are doing with our lives every day.
Now here is the good news. While the task of refocusing legal educa-
tion on its humanistic roots and on the duties of professionalism is a vast
one, we, as individual lawyers, can act now."8 These are, after all, our lives
and our profession.
Let me close with a true story. The ABA Ethics Committee usually
spends its time wrestling with complex cases of conflict of interest or confi-
dentiality. Last spring, however, we had a case that was simplicity itself. A
lawyer's secretary was out sick, and the "temp" erroneously put a top secret
client report into an envelope addressed to the opposing attorney. (The de-
mand letter that was supposed to go to the opposing attorney went into the
client's envelope.) The lawyer discovered the mistake after the mail had
been dispatched but before it had been delivered. He called the lawyer on
the other side and asked him to please return the envelope unopened, as it
contained privileged, confidential client material. The other attorney re-
fused to return the letter without his client's consent and the client said,
"Open it."
The ABA Ethics Committee argued about this case for two days. 19
Twenty years ago, I experienced a similar incident. The senior partner of
my firm mistakenly received a top secret report from the opposing side. He
took two minutes to return the letter unopened, observing that the integrity
of the legal process rested in mutual trust between lawyers and that "we
could lose any client, but not our self-respect."
LEMMINGS, GENTLAaEN AND BARRISTERS: THE INNS OF COURT AND THE ENGLISH BAR 1680-1730
(1990); WILFRED R. PREST, THE INNS OF COURT UNDER ELIZABETH I AND THE EARLY STUARTS
1590-1640 (1972); WILFRED R. PAnsT, THE RISE OF THE BARRISTERS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE
ENGLISH BAR 1590-1640 (1986); J.H. Baker, Introduction to 2 READINGS AND MOOTS AT THE
INNS OF COURT IN THE FIFnTrH CEaNruRY at xv, xv-xxxiii (Samuel E. Thorne & J.H. Baker eds.,
1990).
18. Let me be clear about one possible point of misunderstanding. No sane legal historian
wishes to return to the past. Many aspects of both the early English and American bars were
unattractive and unjust. What I wish to do is to revive certain ideals of professional duty. This
exercise, by its nature, focuses on the best achievements of the past. It ignores the worst, and even
the typical.
19. In the end, the committee decided that the lawyer should return the envelope. See ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-368 (1992).
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Self-respect demands that we get away from the intellectual tyranny of
instrumentalism. We are not just means to someone else's ends. We have a
far prouder heritage, which, unfortunately, has been obscured in the class-
room. This heritage is founded on our ancient duties: to protect the rule of
law as an ideal, to serve the system of justice on which our democracy is
based, and to study and promote humanism-the mutual bonds of our hu-
manity on which peace itself ultimately depends.
I will be happy to answer your questions about what I, as a legal edu-
cator, am trying to do about this in the law school setting. 20 But there is a
more important point. This profession does not belong to the law profes-
sors. It belongs to you and me as lawyers. Each day, and each hour, in our
own professional lives, we possess the power to return to our profession's
fundamental duties and roots. In countless small acts, such as returning
envelopes, we can return the dignity. We can return the sense of self-re-
spect. The ultimate answer to the question "Who cares?" has to be, "We
do."
20. One step currently underway at Boston College Law School is to require both introduc-
tory and advanced courses in legal ethics. The latter are for the third-year students and are taught
in relatively small classes with a personal emphasis. I have just completed materials for such a
course that applies the classical methodologies of Western ethical philosophy to practical, profes-
sional problems. See Di',mt R. CoQuI.LErm, LAWYERS AND FuNDAmENTAL MORAL RESPONSI-
BiLrrTY (forthcoming 1994).
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